By Xiang Gao
The scars left by
the Chinese Government’s COVID-19 policies are still visible
today, despite the silencing of protests.
While
there is no stomach to force change, nor is there any desire to return to the
way things were.
Up to late December 2022 a zero-COVID policy had been enforced nationwide since
the initial 2019 pandemic outbreak in an effort to keep the case numbers as
close to zero as possible.
To
achieve this ambitioustarget, strict public health measures, including mass
testing, lockdowns, and quarantines were adopted.
While
implementing its zero-COVID policy, the Chinese Government reported lower case
and mortality numbers than many Western countries.
However,
while data is uncertain and often anecdotal, the abrupt end of zero-COVID may
have cost as many as 1.41 million deaths between December 2022 and
February this year.
The
pandemic has had significant short and long-term impacts across the world.
Public
health policies and technocratic elites have been challenged; bogus facts and
conspiracy theories have proliferated; work-life patterns have been modified
and economic models are being reconsidered.
In
China, from strictly enforced zero-COVID to its sudden abandonment, the
pandemic has had noteworthy and potentially long-lasting impacts.
The
Chinese authorities received accolades for maintaining low case numbers in
2021-22 while COVID cases abroad skyrocketed.
Nevertheless,
the continuation of harsh lockdowns and the zero-COVID policy, even after
treatments became more efficacious and vaccines more available, was increasingly
questioned through 2022.
Due
to the frustrations that came with extreme
lockdowns, protests erupted in some major Chinese cities in November of
that year.
These
protests were initially triggered by a deadly apartment fire in Urumqi,
Xinjiang, where fire-fighting was significantly slowed by blocked entrances and
locked doors set to comply with the local zero-COVID policy.
Arguably,
this popular dissatisfaction led to zero-COVID’s abandonment, but the abrupt
policy reversal shift has been widely criticised domestically because
of the Government’s lack of preparation and inadequate response measures to
deal with the sudden increase in cases and deaths.
The
consequences of some public health measures also caused public anger and have been
criticised as ill-conceived.
For
example, while many other countries rolled out the vaccine among the older
population first, the Chinese Government prioritised people aged 18-to-60 and
only rolled out the vaccine for people 60 and above from March 2021.
As
a result, many elderly residents had not received their first doses when COVID
restrictions were abruptly lifted, resulting in loss of life.
The
end of zero-COVID was also an immediate burden on the Chinese medical system, resulting
in overloaded hospitals and treatment delays that were exacerbated by a
shortage of healthy medical staff.
Adding
to public frustration, the post-pandemic recovery of the Chinese economy has been
slow to materialise.
As
a result of extreme lockdowns, trade disputes, and other strategic concerns,
many of China’s major trading partners, such as the United States and Europe,
have diversified supply chains and reduced their dependence on Chinese exports.
Many
foreign companies, such as Apple, have withdrawn some of their
investment from the Chinese market due to the political uncertainty.
Domestically,
indebted Local Governments, a dangerously leveraged property sector and falling
house prices, a high unemployment rate (particularly among youth), and
inflation have weakened consumption and slowed production and investment.
In
response, the Government has sought to expand and reground its legitimacy.
Chinese
President Xi Jinping spoke in June on the continuity and unity of the
Chinese civilisation, which he said “fundamentally defined our own path that
the Chinese nation must follow”.
Drawing
on the “only continuing, uninterrupted civilisation in the world”, Mr Xi
advocated for a “true appreciation” of the “necessity, cultural heritage and
unique advantages” of taking the “Chinese path”.
This
“civilisation legitimacy” may be particularly targeted at the younger
generations who have experienced growing national wealth and strength on the
one hand, and inequality and societal discontent on the other.
The
search for civilisation legitimacy is further complemented by the President’s call
for a “high-level of self-reliance and strength” domestically to
support national development.
Such
rhetoric, however, may not be enough to distract the people from the disruption
caused by the Government’s COVID response.
Inequality
and the widening wealth gap were also manifested in the lockdowns.
The
widely publicised food shortage in Shanghai, for instance, was not
evenly spread across the city’s population.
According
to my correspondence with a few Shanghai residents during the 2022 lockdown,
poorer neighbourhoods had to “purchase whatever poor-quality food was available”
while wealthier communities “managed to organise steady, abundant, and
nutritious food supplies through their own social and business connections”.
The
awareness and frustration about inequality, in addition to the poor outlook for
employment and housing, continues to brew in post-pandemic China, especially
among the younger generations.
The
long-term impact of the pandemic will depend upon whether the authorities can adequately
addresses the economic and social problems that have been laid bare by the COVID
years.
Included
in these efforts will be a dose of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, fed by
Chinese social media and directed at outside States and events.
At
the same time, the dramatic expansion of various surveillance and control
measures during the zero-COVID policy, and its continued use in the future, is
likely to make Government control even more effective.
*Xiang Gao holds
a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Auckland,
and an MA in International Relations, minored in American Studies, from Johns
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and Nanjing
University.
This article was first published on the Australian
Outlook page of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
