The decision that doomed the Lib Dems

The result of the British General Election partly confirmed my earlier post in which I said Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn had no chance of winning.

It was an easy prediction to make. Corbyn was perceived by many to be an old-style leftie, set in the ways of public ownership and centralised Government in a world which had moved away from those ideologies.

Moreover, his irritating fence-sitting over whether Britain should leave the European Union had alienated both Brixiteers and Remainers. Trying to be all things to all people, in the end meant he was nothing to anyone on this central issue of the campaign.

Where I got it wrong was my doubt over whether Prime Minister Boris Johnson would get a majority.

Here I was expecting a much better showing from the Liberal Democrats, the one party who throughout its history has supported membership of the European Union.

I thought this would resonate with enough Remain voters for the Liberal Democrats to pick up seats and hold the balance of power in the next Parliament.

Instead the party won a miserable 11 seats and its leader, Jo Swinson, lost hers.

While it is often said that a week is a long time in politics, in searching for the reasons why the Lib Dems failed to break through as a realistic third power and kingmaker in this election, it is necessary to go back almost a decade.

In 2010 the party was riding high with 57 seats and 23 per cent of the vote in the recently completed General Election. The Conservatives, led by David Cameron, had the most seats, but was short of an absolute majority.

After considerable thought the Lib Dems’ leader, Nick Clegg went into coalition with Cameron — it was to prove a fateful decision.

The Conservatives’ central plank was fiscal responsibility after what they considered to be years of wasteful spending under Labour. Among their targets was university tuition fees which they wanted to raise.

The Liberal Democrats had campaigned on the promise they would not raise the fees; Clegg had signed a pledge with the National Union of Students that the party would have none of it, yet in Government he supported the raise.

So the fees went up and Clegg and his party went into sharp decline.

That decision was all the more devastating because with the two major parties moving slowly but steadily towards their extremes, the Lib Dems were finding a centralist role among the moderate middle classes.

Their support was strongest among student activists and academics in the university towns.

As Cameron explains in his recent book, For The Record: “Their tuition-fee reversal was also the worst type of broken promise: The type you  break by actively going back on your word, rather than by failing to meet a target that you have set.

“In my view, that type is far more serious, and will be seen as such by the voters.”

So it was: In the 2015 General Election the Liberal Democrats shrunk to just eight seats and Clegg, belatedly apologising for the tuition fee reversal, resigned.

I believe the party was right to side with the Conservatives in 2010 rather than prop up a tired Labour administration that had been in office for 13 years. However, a full coalition, despite its glittering prize of Ministerial rewards, was a mistake.

An agreement involving a promise to always vote on ‘supply’ of finances so the Government could do its job — and at least abstain on any votes of no confidence, would have been sufficient.

In that way only the Conservatives would have worn the criticism for their unpopular measures and the Lib Dems would have kept faith with their supporters.

This latest poll shows the Liberal Democrats have failed to mend fences and have yet to regain the trust of those who once put their faith in them.

For those of us who believe that Brexit will be disastrous for the UK, it is the true tragedy of this election.