Kashmir a pawn in regional power plays

The decision by the Indian Government to nullify the special status of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, abrupt as it was, should have come as no surprise.

It was part of the election manifesto of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and after its stunning poll victory earlier this year, domestic conditions could not have been better for the move.

While the international reaction has been largely negative, the move has widespread support in India and especially within the nationalist BJP where Cabinet Ministers reportedly made the decision to act after just seven minutes of discussion.

Those who follow events in the troubled region also read the signs. In late July thousands of additional troops were deployed to Kashmir; on August 2 tourists and pilgrims were ordered to leave; two days later internet and phone access was cut and activists arrested.

Then on August 5 Article 370, a constitutional clause dating back to 1949 that gave Jammu and Kashmir its special autonomous status, was revoked.

Few outside India saw it coming because by and large, the world had stopped worrying about Kashmir. There were bigger concerns — trade wars, the Gulf crisis Brexit, Hong Kong — attention was elsewhere.

For Prime Minister Narendra Modi there was both an opportunity and an incentive to remove Kashmir from India’s agenda. The problem has lingered from the early days of independence and partition when its princely ruler, Hari Singh, had dithered over whether to join India or Pakistan.

Pakistani guerrillas invaded assuming this would help persuade Singh to transfer his Muslim majority State to Pakistan. Instead he called on New Delhi for help, which was given on condition he joined India.

The resulting conflict led to a split in the State between Pakistan and India along a ceasefire line mediated by the United Nations which called for a referendum to decide Kashmir’s future. 

In the ensuring years the countries fought twice more over the territory and the UN-proposed referendum never happened. It is this 72-year stalemate that Modi moved to end.

Initially it has led to a storm of protest. Kashmiris under curfew and cut off from the world complain “they are living in hell”. Having suddenly discovered a fresh crisis, international journalists are reporting dire consequences; Pakistani President Imran Khan has likened the action to Nazism.

Modi believes that India can weather the storm with minimal damage to its international reputation. Troops will gradually be withdrawn and restrictions lifted, to be reimposed again if the inevitable disturbances get out of hand.

He knows that Khan can do little more than bluster and appeal to a disinterested international community. India has never been stronger militarily, while Pakistan’s forces are plagued by internal distrust and disputes.

In the longer term Modi believes Indian Kashmir’s status as a regular State will encourage outside investment and a return of the once lucrative tourism industry. He hopes an influx of migrants will help to balance the State’s 77 per cent Muslim majority.

Most importantly for New Delhi is the securing of the region against its giant neighbour, China.

The two countries have never resolved their borders and Beijing continues to produce maps showing large swathes of Indian territory as part of China. Since the BJP came to power, India has become more assertive in pushing back against these claims.

In the end, the fate of Kashmir is wrapped up in the continuing rivalry of these two regional superpowers.