The scars left by the Chinese Government’s COVID-19 policies are still visible today, despite the silencing of protests.
While there is no stomach to force change, nor is there any desire to return to the way things were.
Up to late December 2022 a zero-COVID policy had been enforced nationwide since the initial 2019 pandemic outbreak in an effort to keep the case numbers as close to zero as possible.
To achieve this ambitioustarget, strict public health measures, including mass testing, lockdowns, and quarantines were adopted.
While implementing its zero-COVID policy, the Chinese Government reported lower case and mortality numbers than many Western countries.
However, while data is uncertain and often anecdotal, the abrupt end of zero-COVID may have cost as many as 1.41 million deaths between December 2022 and February this year.
The pandemic has had significant short and long-term impacts across the world.
Public health policies and technocratic elites have been challenged; bogus facts and conspiracy theories have proliferated; work-life patterns have been modified and economic models are being reconsidered.
In China, from strictly enforced zero-COVID to its sudden abandonment, the pandemic has had noteworthy and potentially long-lasting impacts.
The Chinese authorities received accolades for maintaining low case numbers in 2021-22 while COVID cases abroad skyrocketed.
Nevertheless, the continuation of harsh lockdowns and the zero-COVID policy, even after treatments became more efficacious and vaccines more available, was increasingly questioned through 2022.
Due to the frustrations that came with extreme lockdowns, protests erupted in some major Chinese cities in November of that year.
These protests were initially triggered by a deadly apartment fire in Urumqi, Xinjiang, where fire-fighting was significantly slowed by blocked entrances and locked doors set to comply with the local zero-COVID policy.
Arguably, this popular dissatisfaction led to zero-COVID’s abandonment, but the abrupt policy reversal shift has been widely criticised domestically because of the Government’s lack of preparation and inadequate response measures to deal with the sudden increase in cases and deaths.
The consequences of some public health measures also caused public anger and have been criticised as ill-conceived.
For example, while many other countries rolled out the vaccine among the older population first, the Chinese Government prioritised people aged 18-to-60 and only rolled out the vaccine for people 60 and above from March 2021.
As a result, many elderly residents had not received their first doses when COVID restrictions were abruptly lifted, resulting in loss of life.
The end of zero-COVID was also an immediate burden on the Chinese medical system, resulting in overloaded hospitals and treatment delays that were exacerbated by a shortage of healthy medical staff.
Adding to public frustration, the post-pandemic recovery of the Chinese economy has been slow to materialise.
As a result of extreme lockdowns, trade disputes, and other strategic concerns, many of China’s major trading partners, such as the United States and Europe, have diversified supply chains and reduced their dependence on Chinese exports.
Many foreign companies, such as Apple, have withdrawn some of their investment from the Chinese market due to the political uncertainty.
Domestically, indebted Local Governments, a dangerously leveraged property sector and falling house prices, a high unemployment rate (particularly among youth), and inflation have weakened consumption and slowed production and investment.
In response, the Government has sought to expand and reground its legitimacy.
Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke in June on the continuity and unity of the Chinese civilisation, which he said “fundamentally defined our own path that the Chinese nation must follow”.
Drawing on the “only continuing, uninterrupted civilisation in the world”, Mr Xi advocated for a “true appreciation” of the “necessity, cultural heritage and unique advantages” of taking the “Chinese path”.
This “civilisation legitimacy” may be particularly targeted at the younger generations who have experienced growing national wealth and strength on the one hand, and inequality and societal discontent on the other.
The search for civilisation legitimacy is further complemented by the President’s call for a “high-level of self-reliance and strength” domestically to support national development.
Such rhetoric, however, may not be enough to distract the people from the disruption caused by the Government’s COVID response.
Inequality and the widening wealth gap were also manifested in the lockdowns.
The widely publicised food shortage in Shanghai, for instance, was not evenly spread across the city’s population.
According to my correspondence with a few Shanghai residents during the 2022 lockdown, poorer neighbourhoods had to “purchase whatever poor-quality food was available” while wealthier communities “managed to organise steady, abundant, and nutritious food supplies through their own social and business connections”.
The awareness and frustration about inequality, in addition to the poor outlook for employment and housing, continues to brew in post-pandemic China, especially among the younger generations.
The long-term impact of the pandemic will depend upon whether the authorities can adequately addresses the economic and social problems that have been laid bare by the COVID years.
Included in these efforts will be a dose of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, fed by Chinese social media and directed at outside States and events.
At the same time, the dramatic expansion of various surveillance and control measures during the zero-COVID policy, and its continued use in the future, is likely to make Government control even more effective.
*Xiang Gao holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Auckland, and an MA in International Relations, minored in American Studies, from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and Nanjing University.
This article was first published on the Australian Outlook page of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
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