China’s westward march

The announcement that China is increasing its defence spending by nearly 11 per cent to around $115 billion has been met with more than passing interest in capitals around the world - not least because the figure is almost certainly an underestimate.

China rarely gives out accurate information on anything to the rest of the world and is known to be embarking on an all-out expansion and modernisation of its armed forces. Everything from tanks to submarines to aircraft carriers and the most modern and lethal aircraft to fly from them are on the must-have list.

Why this rapid surge in defence spending? Beijing would have us believe it is a selfless contribution to global harmony. In one of those deadpan statements that would do credit to a stand-up comedian if only there was a punch line, a spokesman said the world will be safer knowing China can defend itself.

In fact this is part of what is possibly an historical re-think in where China sees its best interests to lie. For years it has been assumed the country wished to dominate its immediate neighbourhood, drawing into its orbit the countries of South-East Asia and, though our heavy trade dependence on it, Australia. However, this tactic assumed the United States, bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and obsessed with its turbulent Middle Eastern ally Israel, would gradually relinquish its interest in the Asia-Pacific, leaving the territory clear for the new Asian superpower.

But that has not happened. The US is out of Iraq and soon to be out of Afghanistan; Israeli-Palestinian issues will continue to engage diplomats, but not American military resources. President Barack Obama has instead declared the 21^st Century to be the ‘Pacific Century’, the American version of the Asian Century and a clear indication the US intends to remain involved in the region.

That means continued strong support for Japan, its long-time partner in East Asia, and tacit backing for the Philippines and Vietnam, all of which have territorial disputes with China. These countries, along with Taiwan (obviously), Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Australia, have made it quite clear they want a continued US presence on their doorsteps. Obama himself has visited Burma and Cambodia, where China has enjoyed some influence in the past.

It now seems that for the time being at least China is putting East Asia and the Pacific in the too hard basket and switching its interest westwards to central and South Asia, the Middle East – and to strengthening further its already heavy trade involvement in Africa.

From China’s view this makes sense. It has always been happier dealing with authoritarian governments rather than unpredictable democracies and there is plenty of the former in its new hunting ground. Moreover, Beijing figures the US might actually be happy with China expending its energies in the Afghanistan, Iraqi and Syrian quagmires.

Much will depend on the new administration currently taking over the reins of power in Beijing, but since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s successive governments have rarely deviated from established paths.

There is one other problem with this strategy – India.

New Delhi believes that South Asia should be its sphere of influence, but so far has not been very effective in establishing it. Its intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War was a disaster; it remains at loggerheads with Pakistan, and there is an unresolved border dispute with China itself, left over from a short war between the countries half a century ago. The fact that China is establishing port facilities along major shipping lanes between its own mainland and Port Sudan – the so-called String of Pearls – has added to Indian fears that this is part of an overall plan to isolate it.

India’s own defence budget of $37 billion compares unfavourably with its Asian rival and is likely to be a significant issue in next year’s federal election campaign. How all this plays out could well be the focus for global strategists over the next decade.